Behold Mary on the road to Jerusalem to offer her son; she hastens her steps towards the place of sacrifice and she herself bears the beloved Victim in her arms. She enters the Temple, approaches the altar, and there, beaming with modesty, devotion, and humility, presents her son to the Most High.

In the meantime the holy Simeon who had received a promise from God that he should not die without having first seen the expected Messiah, takes the Divine Child from the arms of the Blessed Virgin, and, enlightened by the Holy Spirit, announces to her how much the sacrifice she then made of her son would cost her, and that with Him her own blessed soul would also be sacrificed.

-St Alphonsus de Liguori

"Flee from self-love, the mother of malice, which is an irrational love for the body. For from it are born the three chief sinful passions: gluttony, avarice, and vainglory, which take their causes from bodily needs, and from them all the tribe of the passions is born. This why we must always oppose self-love and fight against it. Whoever rejects self-love will easily conquer all the other passions with the help of God: anger, despondency, rancor, and the others. But whoever is retained by self-love will even unwillingly be conquered by the above-named passions."

- St. Maximus the Confessor

If papal supremacy didn’t exist in the early Church, then how on earth was Pope Leo the one presiding OVER the Council of Chalcedon all the way from Rome…without even being there in person?

Council of Chalcedon (451 AD) -

"Paschasinus, bishop of Lilybaeum, representing Leo the most holy archbishop of the Apostolic See of Senior Rome said in Latin: 'It is well known to this God-beloved council that a divine letter was sent to the blessed and Apostolic Pope Leo summoning him to the holy council. But since neither the custom of antiquity nor the necessities of the general time seemed to allow this, he has charged our littleness to *PRESIDE OVER THIS HOLY COUNCIL IN HIS STEAD*. It is therefore necessary that whatever is brought forward should be examined by our sentence."

Okay... I'll start from the Bottom😂.... I'll post the Debunking Atheism section first❤️🙏

ARGUMENTS AGAINST ATHEISM 👇
(Arguments for the existence of God)

★Aristotelian proof for the existence of God:

part 1

1. Change is a real feature of the world.
2. But change is the actualization of a potential.
3. So, the actualization of potential is a real feature of the world.
4. No potential can be actualized unless something already actual actualizes it (the principle of causality).
5. So, any change is caused by something already actual.
6. The occurrence of any change C presupposes some thing or substance S which changes.
7. The existence of S at any given moment itself presupposes the concurrent actualization of S's potential for existence.
8. So, any substance S has at any moment some actualizer A of its existence.
9. A's own existence at the moment it actualizes S itself presupposes either (a) the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence or (b) A's being purely actual.
10. If A's existence at the moment it actualizes S presupposes the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence, then there exists a regress of concurrent actualizers that is either infinite or terminates in a purely actual actualizer.
11
. But such a regress of concurrent actualizers would constitute a hierarchical causal series, and such a series cannot regress infinitely.
12. So, either A itself is a purely actual actualizer or there is a purely actual actualizer which terminates the regress that begins with the actualization of A.
13. So, the occurrence of C and thus the existence of S at any given moment presupposes the existence of a purely actual actualizer.
14. So, there is a purely actual actualizer.
15. In order for there to be more than one purely actual actualizer, there would have to be some differentiating feature that one such actualizer has that the others lack.
16. But there could be such a differentiating feature only if a purely actual actualizer had some unactualized potential, which, being purely actual, it does not have.
17. So, there can be no such differentiating feature, and thus no way for there to be more than one purely actual actualizer.
18. So, there is only one purely actual actualizer.

★Aristotelian proof for the existence of God:

Part 2

19. In order for this purely actual actualizer to be capable of change, it would have to have potentials capable of actualization.
20. But being purely actual, it lacks any such potentials.
21. So, it is immutable or incapable of change.
22. If this purely actual actualizer existed in time, then it would be capable of change, which it is not.
23. So, this purely actual actualizer is eternal, existing outside of time.
24. If the purely actual actualizer were material, then it would be changeable and exist in time, which it does not.
25. So, the purely actual actualizer is immaterial.
26. If the purely actual actualizer were corporeal, then it would be material, which it is not.
27. So, the purely actual actualizer is incorporeal.
28. If the purely actual actualizer were imperfect in any way, it would have some unactualized potential, which, being purely actual, it does not have.
29. So, the purely actual actualizer is perfect.
30. For something to be less than fully good is for it to have a privation -that is, to fail to actualize some feature proper to it.
31. A purely actual actualizer, being purely actual, can have no such privation.
32. So, the purely actual actualizer is fully good.
33. To have power entails being able to actualize potentials.
34. Any potential that is actualized is either actualized by the purely actual actualizer or by a series of actualizers which terminates in the purely actual actualizer.
35. So, all power derives from the purely actual actualizer.
36. But to be that from which all power derives is to be omnipotent.

37. So, the purely actual actualizer is omnipotent.
38. Whatever is in an effect is in its cause in some way, whether formally, virtually, or eminently (the principle of proportionate causality).
39. The purely actual actualizer is the cause of all things.
40. So, the forms or patterns manifest in all the things it causes must in some way be in the purely actual actualizer.
41. These forms or patterns can exist either in the concrete way in which they exist in individual particular things, or in the abstract way in which they exist in the thoughts of an intellect.

★Aristotelian proof for the existence of God:

Part 3


42. They cannot exist in the purely actual actualizer in the same way they exist in individual particular things.
43. So, they must exist in the purely actual actualizer in the abstract way in which they exist in the thoughts of an intellect.
44. So, the purely actual actualizer has intellect or intelligence.
45. Since it is the forms or patterns of all things that are in the thoughts of this intellect, there is nothing that is outside the range of those thoughts.
46. For there to be nothing outside the range of something's thoughts is for that thing to be ominiscient.
47. So, the purely actual actualizer is omniscient.
48. So, there exists a purely actual cause of the existence of things, which is one, immutable, eternal, immaterial, incorporeal, perfect, fully good, omnipotent, intelligent, and omniscient.
49. But for there to be such a cause of things is just what it is for God to exist.
50. So, God exists.

●The Neo-Platonic proof for the existence of God

Part 1

1. The things of our experience are composite.
2. A composite exists at any moment only insofar as its parts are combined at that moment.
3. This composition of parts requires a concurrent cause.
4. So, any composite has a cause of its existence at any moment at which it exists.
5. So, each of the things of our experience has a cause at any moment at which it exists.
6. If the cause of a composite thing's existence at any moment is itself composite, then it will in turn require a cause of its own existence at that moment.
7. The regress of causes this entails is hierarchical in nature, and such a regress must have a first member.
8. Only something absolutely simple or noncomposite could be the first member of such a series.
9. So, the existence of each of the things of our experience presupposes an absolutely simple or noncomposite cause.
10. In order for there to be more than absolutely one simple or noncomposite cause, each would have to have some differentiating feature that the others lacked.
11. But for a cause to have such a feature would be for it to have parts, in which case it would not really be simple or noncomposite.
12. So, no absolutely simple or noncomposite cause can have such a differentiating feature.
13. So, there cannot be more than one absolutely simple or non-composite cause.

●The Neo-Platonic proof for the existence of God

Part 2

14. If the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause were changeable, then it would have parts which it gains or loses which, being simple or non-composite, it does not have.
15. So, the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause is changeless or immutable.
16. If the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause had a beginning or an end, it would have parts which could either be combined or broken apart.
17. So, since it has no such parts, the absolutely simple or non-composite cause is beginningless and endless.
18. Whatever is immutable, beginningless, and endless is eternal.
19. So, the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause is eternal.
20. If something is caused, then it has parts which need to be combined.
21. So, the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause, since it has no parts, is uncaused.

22. Everything is either a mind, or a mental content, or a material entity, or an abstract entity.
23. An abstract entity is causally inert.
24. So, the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause, since it is not causally inert, is not an abstract entity.
25. A material entity has parts and is changeable.
26. So, the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause, since it is without parts and changeless, is not a material entity.
27. A mental content presupposes the existence of a mind, and so cannot be the ultimate cause of anything.
28. So, the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause, being the ultimate cause of things, cannot be a mental content.
29. So, the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause must be a mind.
30. Since the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause is unique, everything other than it is composite.
31. Every composite has the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause as its ultimate cause.
32. So, the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause is the ultimate cause of everything other than itself.
33. If the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause had potentialities as well as actualities, it would have parts

●The Neo-Platonic proof for the existence of God


Part 3

34. So, since it has no parts, it must have no potentialities but be purely actual.
35. A purely actual cause must be perfect, omnipotent, fully good, and omniscient.
36. So, there exists a cause which is simple or noncomposite, unique, immutable, eternal, immaterial, a mind or intellect, the uncaused ultimate cause of everything other than itself, purely actual, perfect, omnipotent, fully good, and omniscient.
37. But for there to be such a cause is just what it is for God to exist.
38. So, God exists.

■The Augustinian Proof for the Existence of God:

Part 1:

1. There are three possible accounts of abstract objects such as universals, propositions, numbers and other mathematical objects, and possible worlds: realism, nominalism, and conceptualism.
2. There are decisive arguments in favor of realism.
3. There are insuperable objections against nominalism.
4. There are insuperable objections against conceptualism.
5. So, some version of realism is true.
6. There are three possible versions of realism: Platonic realism, Aristotelian realism, and Scholastic realism.
7. If Platonic realism is true, then abstract objects exist in a "third realm" distinct from either the material world or any intellect.
8. If Aristotelian realism is true, then abstract objects exist only in human or other contingently existing intellects.
9. If Scholastic realism is true, then abstract objects exist not only in contingently existing intellects but also in at least one necessarily existing intellect.
10. There are insuperable objections against the claim that abstract objects exist in a "third realm" distinct from either the material world or any intellect.
11. So, Platonic realism is not true.
12. There are insuperable objections against the claim that abstract objects exist only in human or other contingently existing intellects.
13. So, Aristotelian realism is not true.
14. So, Scholastic realism is true.
15. So, abstract objects exist not only in contingently existing intellects but also in at least one necessarily existing intellect.
16. Abstract objects such as universals, propositions, numbers and other mathematical objects, and possible worlds are all logically related to one another in such a way that they form an interlocking system of ideas to one another in such a way that they form an interlocking system of ideas.

■The Augustinian Proof for the Existence of God:

Part 2:


17. The reasons for concluding that at least some abstract objects exist in a necessarily existing intellect also entail that this interlocking system of ideas must exist in a necessarily existing intellect.

18. So, this interlocking system of ideas exists in at least one necessarily existing intellect.
19. A necessarily existing intellect would be purely actual.
20. There cannot be more than one thing that is purely actual.
21. So, there cannot be more than one necessarily existing intellect.
22. An intellect in which the interlocking system of ideas in question existed would be conceptually omniscient.
23. So, the one necessarily existing intellect is conceptually omniscient.
24. If this one necessarily existing intellect were not also omniscient in the stronger sense that it knows all contingent truths, then it would have unrealized potential and thus not be purely actual.
25. So, it is also omniscient in this stronger sense.
26. What is purely actual must also be omnipotent, fully good, immutable, immaterial, incorporeal, and eternal.
27. So, there is exactly one necessarily existing intellect, which is purely actual, omniscient, omnipotent, fully good, immutable, immaterial, incorporeal, and eternal.
28. But for there to be such a thing is just what it is for God to exist.
29. So, God exists.

¤》The Thomistic Proof for the Existence of God:

Part 1:

1. For any of the things we know from experience (stones, trees, dogs, human beings, etc.), there is a distinction to be drawn between its essence and its existence.
2. If this were not a real distinction a distinction between aspects of reality itself and not merely between ways of thinking or talking about reality-then we could know whether or not a thing exists simply by knowing its essence.
3. But we cannot know whether or not a thing exists simply by knowing its essence.
4. If it were not a real distinction, then the things we know from experience would exist in a necessary way rather than in a merely contingent way.
5. But in fact they exist in a merely contingent way, and not in a necessary way.
6. If there could in principle be more than one thing the essence of which is identical to its existence, then two or more such things would be distinguishable in the way that species of the same genus are distinguished, or members of the same species are distinguished, or in some other way.
7. But they cannot be distinguished in any of these ways.
8. So, there could not in principle be more than one thing the essence of which is identical to its existence.
9. So, for any of the things we know from experience, if the distinction between its essence and its existence were not a real distinction, then there could not in principle be more than one of them.
10. But in fact, for each of the things we know from experience, there is, or could be, more than one of them.
11. So, for each of the things we know from experience, the distinction between its essence and its existence is a real distinction.
12. For anything the essence of which is really distinct from its existence, its existence must be imparted to it either by itself or by some cause distinct from it.
13. But if it imparted existence to itself, it would be the cause of itself.
14. Nothing can be the cause of itself.
15. So, it cannot impart existence to itself.
16. So, for anything the essence of which is really distinct from its existence, its existence must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it.
17. Since its essence and existence remain really distinct at every
moment at which it exists, including here and now, its existence must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now.
18. So, for each of the things we know from experience, its existence must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now.
19. Either this cause is itself something the essence of which is distinct from its existence, or it is something whose essence and existence are identical, something that just is subsistent existence itself.

¤》The Thomistic Proof for the Existence of God:

Part 2:

20. If this cause is something the essence of which is distinct from its existence, then its own existence too must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now.
21. The causal series this would generate would be a hierarchical one, which cannot regress infinitely but must have a first member.
22. This first member could only be something whose essence and existence are identical, something that just is subsistent existence itself.
23. So, either directly or indirectly, each of the things we know from experience has its existence imparted to it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now, by some cause whose essence and existence are identical, something that just is subsistent existence itself.
24. Since there cannot in principle be more than one thing the essence of which is identical to its existence, this cause which is subsistent existence itself is unique.
25. Since it is unique, anything other than it that exists must be something the essence of which is distinct from its existence.
26. Anything the essence of which is distinct from its existence will, either directly or indirectly, have its existence imparted to it by a cause which is subsistent existence itself.
27. So, this unique cause which is subsistent existence itself is the cause of everything other than itself.
28. Since whatever lacks a real distinction between its essence and its existence would exist in a necessary rather than contingent way, this unique cause which is subsistent existence itself exists in a necessary way.
29. Whatever is subsistent existence itself need not and could not have had a cause of its own.
30. So, this unique cause which is subsistent existence itself is uncaused.
31. If that which is subsistent existence itself had some potentiality for existence which needed to be actualized, then existence would have to be imparted to it by some cause.
32. So, that which is subsistent existence itself has no potential for existence which needs actualization, but rather exists in a purely actual way.

¤》The Thomistic Proof for the Existence of God:

Part 3:

33. Whatever is purely actual must be immutable, eternal, immaterial, incorporeal, perfect, omnipotent, fully good, intelligent, and omniscient.
34. So, each of the things of our experience has its existence imparted to it at every moment by a cause which is Subsistent Existence Itself, one, necessarily existing, the uncaused cause of everything other than itself, purely actual, immutable, eternal, immaterial, incorporeal, perfect, omnipotent, fully good, intelligent, and omniscient.
35. But for there to be such a cause is for God to exist.
36. So, God exists.

◆Rationalist Proof for the Existence of God:

Part 1:

1. The principle of sufficient reason (PSR) holds that there is an explanation for the existence of anything that does exist and for its having the attributes it has.
2. If PSR were not true, then things and events without evident explanation or intelligibility would be extremely common.
3. But this is the opposite of what common sense and science alike find to be the case.
4. If PSR were not true, then we would be unable to trust our own cognitive faculties.
5. But in fact we are able to trust those faculties.
6. Furthermore, there is no principled way to deny the truth of PSR while generally accepting that there are genuine explanations in science and philosophy.
7. But there are many genuine explanations to be found in science and philosophy.
8. So, PSR is true.
9. The explanation of the existence of anything is to be found either in some other thing which causes it, in which case it is contingent, or in its own nature, in which case it is necessary; PSR rules out any purported third alternative on which a thing's existence is explained by nothing.

10. There are contingent things.
11. Even if the existence of an individual contingent thing could be explained by reference to some previously existing contingent thing, which in turn could be explained by a previous member, and so on to infinity, that the infinite series as a whole exists at all would remain to be explained.
12. To explain this series by reference to some further contingent cause outside the series, and then explain this cause in terms of some yet further contingent thing, and so on to infinity, would merely yield another series whose existence would remain to be explained; and to posit yet another contingent thing outside this second series would merely generate the same problem yet again.

◆Rationalist Argument for the existence of God:

Part 2:


13. So, no contingent thing or series of contingent things can explain why there are any contingent things at all.
14. But that there are any contingent things at all must have some explanation, given PSR; and the only remaining explanation is in terms of a necessary being as cause.
15. Furthermore, that an individual contingent thing persists in existence at any moment requires an explanation; and since it is contingent, that explanation must lie in some simultaneous cause distinct from it.
16. If this cause is itself contingent, then even if it has yet another contingent thing as its own simultaneous cause, and that cause yet another contingent thing as its simultaneous cause, and so on to infinity, then once again we have an infinite series of contingent things the existence of which has yet to be explained.
17. So, no contingent thing or series of contingent things can explain why any particular contingent thing persists in existence at any moment; and the only remaining explanation is in terms of a necessary being as its simultaneous cause.
18. So, there must be at least one necessary being, to explain why any contingent things exist at all and how any particular contingent thing persists in existence at any moment.
19. A necessary being would have to be purely actual, absolutely simple or noncomposite, and something which just is subsistent existence itself.
20. But there can in principle be only one thing which is purely actual, absolutely simple or noncomposite, and something which just is subsistent existence itself.
21. So, there is only one necessary being.
22. So, it is this same one necessary being which is the explanation of why any contingent things exist at all and which is the cause of every particular contingent thing's existing at any moment.
23. So, this necessary being is the cause of everything other than itself.
24. Something which is purely actual, absolutely simple or non-composite, and something which just is subsistent existence itself must also be immutable, eternal, immaterial, incorporeal, perfect, omnipotent, fully good, intelligent, and omniscient.
25. So, there is a necessary being which is one, purely actual, absolutely simple, subsistent existence itself, cause of everything other than itself, immutable, eternal, immaterial, incorporeal, perfect, omnipotent, fully good, intelligent, and omniscient.
26. But for there to be such a thing is for God to exist.
27. So, God exists.

Argumenta contra atheismum

ARGUMENTS TO REFUTE ATHEISM

Argumenta contra atheismum (Arguments against Atheism)

“The Friends of the Holy Father” meet Pope Leo in Rome

In 1979, "The Friends of the Holy Father" association started in London with the mission of offering direct and concrete support to the Holy Father: a prompt response to the appeal of Pope John Paul II, who, immediately upon his election, had requested prayers, sacrifice, and help for his "heavy burden."

The association, which carries on the legacy of a previous organization that was active until 1941, represents an act of love and solidarity aimed at assisting the mission of the Successor of Peter.

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CARDINAL MAR BASELIOS

Pope signs Apostolic Letter marking sixtieth anniversary of Gravissimum Educationis

Joining students of Pontifical Universities on Monday, as part of the Jubilee of the World of Education, Pope Leo XIV signed an Apostolic Letter, written to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of Gravissimum Educationis, and to reflect on the current relevance of the Conciliar Declaration and on the challenges that education has to face today, in particular for Catholic schools and universities.

The Letter will be made public on Tuesday, 28 October.

Pope Leo went on to lament that in the modern world, humanity has become “experts in the smallest details of reality” yet struggles to recover an overall vision - one that unites knowledge with meaning.

Against this fragmentation, he invited scholars to rediscover the harmony between intellect and spirit, a unity embodied by saints such as Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Teresa of Ávila, and Edith Stein.

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Principles of Aesthetics - Integritas, Consonantia, Claritas

source🔗

For the medieval theologian a beautiful thing had three primary characteristics (Summa Theologica, First Part, Question 39, Article 8):

1. Integritas (wholeness) – It must not be deficient in what it needs to be most itself.

2. Consonantia (proportionality) – Its dimensions should suitably correspond to other physical objects as well as to a metaphysical ideal, an end.

3. Claritas (radiance) – It should clearly radiate intelligibility, the logic of its inner being and impress this knowledge of itself on the mind of the perceiver.

*Architectural historian and liturgical design consultant Dr. Denis McNamara, assistant director at the Liturgical Institute of the University of Saint Mary of the Lake/Mundelein Seminary (Illinois, US) explains:

Integritas, claritas, and consonantia prove critical in building a church, because as a theological and sacramental revelation of the new heaven and new earth, a beautiful church will provide a fullness of theological ideas but being complete not only in all of its functional parts, but also in its sacred imagery.

Moreover, these parts will be proportional to their nature, showing not merely an earthly meeting hall, but an icon of a glorified reality, conventionally understood in architecture through sophistication of design, rich materials, and high levels of craft to be worthy of a church. This worthiness and glorification is made knowable to the mind of the viewer, for whom the church building impresses into his or her mind the signs and symbols of heavenly realities.

This participation in the liturgy is the aim to be considered before all else specifically because by perceiving heavenly realities in earthly matter, we have the opportunity to become heavenly ourselves, and we are suited to live happily with God for eternity.
(Denis Robert McNamara, Catholic Church Architecture and the Spirit of the Liturgy (2009))

#beauty