Article critiquing main schools of thinking in Putin’s Russian demographic policy: ultraconservative (more radical ideas including a full abortion ban) & pragmatist (natalist benefits+payouts).

https://t.co/GNUepMAey9

Myanmar is being slowly destroyed town by town (now apparently becoming city by city). Emigration and refugee flows to neighboring countries & the destruction of many opportunities leave a bleak future. On top of all this the country has below replacement fertility.

https://www.group-telegram.com/AMK_Mapping/12377

Number of Venezuelans emigrants in recent years is almost unbelievable. ~8 million Venezuelans have fled. This is worse emigration than Syria or any other country for its size. Despite Maduro calling for Venezuelan women to have lots of kids they will never recover.

The Maduro regime has permanently destroyed the demographic future of the country. What has happened to Venezuela is worse than what befell Zimbabwe from 1987-2017 under Mugabe.

https://www.unhcr.org/us/emergencies/venezuela-situation

Egypt may hit replacement as early as 2026. Likely to be at 1.5 by 2035. This is the probable result of secular Egyptian fertility rates hitting East Asian levels (as Sisi wanted) while religious Egyptian fertility stays above 2.0.

Piece on how demographic decline may lead to an increase in warfare (motivated by the desire to compensate, directly or indirectly, for population loss).  Author postulates this may have been a driving factor behind Putin’s full scale invasion of Ukraine.

https://t.co/HCo1H3Cx9K

Have long argued that catastrophic demographics present a national security risk. As we return to an era of military might resolving territorial/boundary disputes this becomes even more so.

For example, during the 1990s Armenia-Azerbaijan War over Artsakh/Karabakh Azerbaijan had almost 3.5 million people and Azerbaijan was around double. By the 2020 War Armenia had fallen to ~3 million while Azerbaijan had risen to ~10 million.

Only 4.7% of births in South Korea were outside of marriage in 2023. The average age at first marriage for South Korean women is 31.6 as of 2024. South Korean women, on average, wait about 16 months to have their first child after marriage. TFR in South Korea is 0.75.

Greece increasingly certain to hit all time TFR low below 1.2 this year. Greece has seen less than 100,000 annual births since 2013. Births may go below 65,000 this year & annual births are very likely to stay sub 100,000 going forward even if TFR were to rebound significantly.

Almost twice as many South Korean men as women want a large family of 3 kids or more. 22% of men want 3 or more children while only 12% of women do. & far less than 12% actually end up having 3 kids.

Italy is basically the opposite of South Korea with far more women expressing 3+ children as the ideal (22%) than men (13%). Hungary is interesting in that both a relatively high number of men & women (28% & 23% respectively)have a 3+ child ideal yet Hungarian TFR is sub 1.4.

Bolivia (estimated at sub 2.09 TFR for 2024) & Paraguay (estimated at sub 2.0 TFR for 2024) have fallen below replacement level fertility.  Venezuela has also likely fallen below that level.  If confirmed this means all countries(bar Guyana)in South America now below replacement.

If Honduras falls below replacement in 2025 then all of Central America will be below replacement (yes even Nicaragua with sub 1.9, Guatemala with sub 2.09, & Belize with ~1.8). Truly remarkable how fast the demographic transition is occurring everywhere.

Estonian births down 10% year on year, Lithuanian down 14%+, Latvian down 12% plus. All the Baltic states are on track to have a TFR of 1.10 or below this year.