If Russia goes down this path, the key objective would not necessarily be to capture the cities themselves, but to control transport hubs and intersections, which would be sufficient to paralyse the movement of reserves, cut off communications with Lithuania and the Suwalki Corridor, and force NATO into hasty and uncoordinated actions.
Moreover, given Russia's experience in the war against Ukraine, especially in the first months, electronic warfare (EW) and camouflage are likely to be widely used, including mobile groups operating without a single front line. In such conditions, there is a possibility of temporary loss of command and control in the Latvian sector of NATO, as well as a disconnect between political decisions and operational reality. This creates a window for projecting force — advancing to Tukums, partially blockading Riga, and possibly simulating preparations for an amphibious landing along the coast. From an informational and psychological point of view, this would be no less devastating than a full-scale occupation.
Based on the experience of the war against Ukraine, in particular the failure of large-scale Russian offensive operations in conditions of saturated ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance), it can be assumed that at this stage there will be no classic dense offensive formation. Instead, a "pulsing offensive" model will be used, in which mobile advance units penetrate deep into the territory, operating outside a dense logistical framework but with powerful artillery support at the tactical level.
This was already used in 2022–2023 in Ukraine, especially during the offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region, when assault companies were deployed and then logistical expansion was carried out along a narrow corridor without waiting for the flanks to be fully stabilised. In the event of an attack on Latvia, this would involve the capture or blockade of key transport hubs, including Jelgava, Tukums and possibly Ventspils, with minimal mop-up operations and only targeted control of communications.
The main goal would not be classic territorial control, but operational and political effects, the division of the country and the isolation of Riga. Russia could then issue an ultimatum: a ceasefire and recognition of the "new status quo" in exchange for the opening of a humanitarian corridor and the cessation of further mobilisation in the Baltic states.
In combination with a massive RE campaign — disruption of mobile communications, suppression of GPS and disinformation about the alleged mass flight of the government and the presence of "peace representatives" at the scene — Russia is likely seeking to create an atmosphere of partial collapse of the state power vertical in Latvia. This would repeat not only the Ukrainian scenario of February 2022, but also elements of the reactive pressure model that Russia used in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Crimea — not taking everything, but cutting off, intimidating and offering an "agreed way out" of the "dead end" that it itself created.
The ATO's remark is what the partners did not write about.
In reality, Russia is not preparing an attack on Latvia. It is preparing an attack from Latvia.
Nonsense? Not quite. Because in reality, this infrastructure is not for an attack on NATO, but for simulating a threat from the west, deep inside Russia itself. I will explain why
There are no suicidal Kremlin pensioners in Russia; they have no intention of fighting NATO. That is why they are preparing an inverted "22 June", only in the opposite direction.
The Russians do not want to attack, they want to be attacked.
The hidden mobilisation near the Latvian border is not for invasion, but to provoke an attack on itself, so that it can then declare "patriotic war number two" and blame the defeat in Ukraine on "the West starting a new war."
North Korean weapons and "malvas" are bait for NATO to take, so that Russia can then use force and resources on its own territory and "reach Berlin" (Riga).
If Russia goes down this path, the key objective would not necessarily be to capture the cities themselves, but to control transport hubs and intersections, which would be sufficient to paralyse the movement of reserves, cut off communications with Lithuania and the Suwalki Corridor, and force NATO into hasty and uncoordinated actions.
Moreover, given Russia's experience in the war against Ukraine, especially in the first months, electronic warfare (EW) and camouflage are likely to be widely used, including mobile groups operating without a single front line. In such conditions, there is a possibility of temporary loss of command and control in the Latvian sector of NATO, as well as a disconnect between political decisions and operational reality. This creates a window for projecting force — advancing to Tukums, partially blockading Riga, and possibly simulating preparations for an amphibious landing along the coast. From an informational and psychological point of view, this would be no less devastating than a full-scale occupation.
Based on the experience of the war against Ukraine, in particular the failure of large-scale Russian offensive operations in conditions of saturated ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance), it can be assumed that at this stage there will be no classic dense offensive formation. Instead, a "pulsing offensive" model will be used, in which mobile advance units penetrate deep into the territory, operating outside a dense logistical framework but with powerful artillery support at the tactical level.
This was already used in 2022–2023 in Ukraine, especially during the offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region, when assault companies were deployed and then logistical expansion was carried out along a narrow corridor without waiting for the flanks to be fully stabilised. In the event of an attack on Latvia, this would involve the capture or blockade of key transport hubs, including Jelgava, Tukums and possibly Ventspils, with minimal mop-up operations and only targeted control of communications.
The main goal would not be classic territorial control, but operational and political effects, the division of the country and the isolation of Riga. Russia could then issue an ultimatum: a ceasefire and recognition of the "new status quo" in exchange for the opening of a humanitarian corridor and the cessation of further mobilisation in the Baltic states.
In combination with a massive RE campaign — disruption of mobile communications, suppression of GPS and disinformation about the alleged mass flight of the government and the presence of "peace representatives" at the scene — Russia is likely seeking to create an atmosphere of partial collapse of the state power vertical in Latvia. This would repeat not only the Ukrainian scenario of February 2022, but also elements of the reactive pressure model that Russia used in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Crimea — not taking everything, but cutting off, intimidating and offering an "agreed way out" of the "dead end" that it itself created.
The ATO's remark is what the partners did not write about.
In reality, Russia is not preparing an attack on Latvia. It is preparing an attack from Latvia.
Nonsense? Not quite. Because in reality, this infrastructure is not for an attack on NATO, but for simulating a threat from the west, deep inside Russia itself. I will explain why
There are no suicidal Kremlin pensioners in Russia; they have no intention of fighting NATO. That is why they are preparing an inverted "22 June", only in the opposite direction.
The Russians do not want to attack, they want to be attacked.
The hidden mobilisation near the Latvian border is not for invasion, but to provoke an attack on itself, so that it can then declare "patriotic war number two" and blame the defeat in Ukraine on "the West starting a new war."
North Korean weapons and "malvas" are bait for NATO to take, so that Russia can then use force and resources on its own territory and "reach Berlin" (Riga).
Some people used the platform to organize ahead of the storming of the U.S. Capitol in January 2021, and last month Senator Mark Warner sent a letter to Durov urging him to curb Russian information operations on Telegram. In view of this, the regulator has cautioned investors not to rely on such investment tips / advice received through social media platforms. It has also said investors should exercise utmost caution while taking investment decisions while dealing in the securities market. But Kliuchnikov, the Ukranian now in France, said he will use Signal or WhatsApp for sensitive conversations, but questions around privacy on Telegram do not give him pause when it comes to sharing information about the war. The account, "War on Fakes," was created on February 24, the same day Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a "special military operation" and troops began invading Ukraine. The page is rife with disinformation, according to The Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab, which studies digital extremism and published a report examining the channel. Apparently upbeat developments in Russia's discussions with Ukraine helped at least temporarily send investors back into risk assets. Russian President Vladimir Putin said during a meeting with his Belarusian counterpart Alexander Lukashenko that there were "certain positive developments" occurring in the talks with Ukraine, according to a transcript of their meeting. Putin added that discussions were happening "almost on a daily basis."
from ar
