An additional indicator of future operations is the systematic intensification of infrastructure in the north and north-west of Russia. In particular, this includes the reconstruction and expansion of railway junctions in the Pskov region, the modernisation of storage facilities in the Ostrov, Velikie Luki and Palkino areas, and the restoration of Soviet-era logistics facilities such as auxiliary stations, spare flyovers and ammunition depots (Pskov region website). These measures do not make sense for supplying the front in Ukraine, but are logically consistent with preparations for rapid deployment towards Latvia, especially given that these regions border Daugavpils and Rezekne
Equally worrying is the evolution of the role of the Belarusian component. The Belarusian armed forces have traditionally been seen as a secondary instrument in Russia's strategic calculations. However, in 2024–2025, Belarus deployed territorial defence units, drawing on its mobilisation reserve; conducted large-scale exercises simulating the defence of the western direction, which secretly model a strike deep into Latvia and Lithuania, and established temporary military bases and headquarters, in which supply depots and medical facilities have been pre-positioned
Indirect strategic signs of Russia's restructuring near the Baltic states include the disappearance of public information about the movement of certain echelons, in particular the movement of North Korean equipment in Siberia, GPS and mobile signal jamming in border areas, as well as the absence of Russia's usual "demonstrative" video reports of military convoys on TikTok and Telegram. This suggests that these forces are not part of Russia's rotational forces for Ukraine, but rather a tool for covert mobilisation and hidden redeployment — in full accordance with the classic model of strategic masked offensive operations described by Svechin.
Operational use of success — access to the sea, blockade of Riga
Based on the author's many years of experience as a military analyst and combat veteran, below is a likely path that Russian troops will take if Russia is indeed gathering forces near the border with Latvia for an offensive operation.
If Russia succeeds in capturing Daugavpils and Rezekne, Russian troops are unlikely to linger to hold eastern Latgale, but will advance along a trajectory from Rezekne to Preili, then to Jekabpils and finally to Jelgava, following the A6 motorway and railway lines. This would allow them to shorten logistical distances, outflank potential North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) reserves and reach the operational space leading to Tukums or Riga.
If successful at this stage, three strategic effects will be achieved simultaneously. First, Russia will be able to dismember Latvia's defences by blocking the transfer of troops from southern Lithuania to the north, to the border with Estonia. Second, Russia would threaten the flank of Riga, causing political and psychological instability. Third, Russia will create a beachhead on the Baltic coast via Tukums or Ventspils, which it could potentially use to transfer reinforcements by sea, demonstrate its strength, or create a "Kurland enclave."
The logic applied here reflects the logic of the operation in Šiauliai in August 1944 on the 1st Baltic Front, which was not a frontal battle for large centres during World War II, but rather an encirclement, capturing important lines of communication and destabilising enemy coordination. A modern analogue of this is the use of "tentacles" of battalion tactical groups in Russia's war against Ukraine — rapid advances in weakly defended directions, followed by a build-up of military presence and encirclement of the territory.
By analogy with Operation Doppelkopf, during which German troops reached Tukums in an attempt to re-establish contact with Courland, Russian forces could use bypass routes along the A6 and A8 motorways, cutting off Riga from the south and depriving it of logistical support.
An additional indicator of future operations is the systematic intensification of infrastructure in the north and north-west of Russia. In particular, this includes the reconstruction and expansion of railway junctions in the Pskov region, the modernisation of storage facilities in the Ostrov, Velikie Luki and Palkino areas, and the restoration of Soviet-era logistics facilities such as auxiliary stations, spare flyovers and ammunition depots (Pskov region website). These measures do not make sense for supplying the front in Ukraine, but are logically consistent with preparations for rapid deployment towards Latvia, especially given that these regions border Daugavpils and Rezekne
Equally worrying is the evolution of the role of the Belarusian component. The Belarusian armed forces have traditionally been seen as a secondary instrument in Russia's strategic calculations. However, in 2024–2025, Belarus deployed territorial defence units, drawing on its mobilisation reserve; conducted large-scale exercises simulating the defence of the western direction, which secretly model a strike deep into Latvia and Lithuania, and established temporary military bases and headquarters, in which supply depots and medical facilities have been pre-positioned
Indirect strategic signs of Russia's restructuring near the Baltic states include the disappearance of public information about the movement of certain echelons, in particular the movement of North Korean equipment in Siberia, GPS and mobile signal jamming in border areas, as well as the absence of Russia's usual "demonstrative" video reports of military convoys on TikTok and Telegram. This suggests that these forces are not part of Russia's rotational forces for Ukraine, but rather a tool for covert mobilisation and hidden redeployment — in full accordance with the classic model of strategic masked offensive operations described by Svechin.
Operational use of success — access to the sea, blockade of Riga
Based on the author's many years of experience as a military analyst and combat veteran, below is a likely path that Russian troops will take if Russia is indeed gathering forces near the border with Latvia for an offensive operation.
If Russia succeeds in capturing Daugavpils and Rezekne, Russian troops are unlikely to linger to hold eastern Latgale, but will advance along a trajectory from Rezekne to Preili, then to Jekabpils and finally to Jelgava, following the A6 motorway and railway lines. This would allow them to shorten logistical distances, outflank potential North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) reserves and reach the operational space leading to Tukums or Riga.
If successful at this stage, three strategic effects will be achieved simultaneously. First, Russia will be able to dismember Latvia's defences by blocking the transfer of troops from southern Lithuania to the north, to the border with Estonia. Second, Russia would threaten the flank of Riga, causing political and psychological instability. Third, Russia will create a beachhead on the Baltic coast via Tukums or Ventspils, which it could potentially use to transfer reinforcements by sea, demonstrate its strength, or create a "Kurland enclave."
The logic applied here reflects the logic of the operation in Šiauliai in August 1944 on the 1st Baltic Front, which was not a frontal battle for large centres during World War II, but rather an encirclement, capturing important lines of communication and destabilising enemy coordination. A modern analogue of this is the use of "tentacles" of battalion tactical groups in Russia's war against Ukraine — rapid advances in weakly defended directions, followed by a build-up of military presence and encirclement of the territory.
By analogy with Operation Doppelkopf, during which German troops reached Tukums in an attempt to re-establish contact with Courland, Russian forces could use bypass routes along the A6 and A8 motorways, cutting off Riga from the south and depriving it of logistical support.
The regulator took order for the search and seizure operation from Judge Purushottam B Jadhav, Sebi Special Judge / Additional Sessions Judge. Update March 8, 2022: EFF has clarified that Channels and Groups are not fully encrypted, end-to-end, updated our post to link to Telegram’s FAQ for Cloud and Secret chats, updated to clarify that auto-delete is available for group and channel admins, and added some additional links. And indeed, volatility has been a hallmark of the market environment so far in 2022, with the S&P 500 still down more than 10% for the year-to-date after first sliding into a correction last month. The CBOE Volatility Index, or VIX, has held at a lofty level of more than 30. At this point, however, Durov had already been working on Telegram with his brother, and further planned a mobile-first social network with an explicit focus on anti-censorship. Later in April, he told TechCrunch that he had left Russia and had “no plans to go back,” saying that the nation was currently “incompatible with internet business at the moment.” He added later that he was looking for a country that matched his libertarian ideals to base his next startup. False news often spreads via public groups, or chats, with potentially fatal effects.
from kr
