If Russia goes down this path, the key objective would not necessarily be to capture the cities themselves, but to control transport hubs and intersections, which would be sufficient to paralyse the movement of reserves, cut off communications with Lithuania and the Suwalki Corridor, and force NATO into hasty and uncoordinated actions.
Moreover, given Russia's experience in the war against Ukraine, especially in the first months, electronic warfare (EW) and camouflage are likely to be widely used, including mobile groups operating without a single front line. In such conditions, there is a possibility of temporary loss of command and control in the Latvian sector of NATO, as well as a disconnect between political decisions and operational reality. This creates a window for projecting force — advancing to Tukums, partially blockading Riga, and possibly simulating preparations for an amphibious landing along the coast. From an informational and psychological point of view, this would be no less devastating than a full-scale occupation.
Based on the experience of the war against Ukraine, in particular the failure of large-scale Russian offensive operations in conditions of saturated ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance), it can be assumed that at this stage there will be no classic dense offensive formation. Instead, a "pulsing offensive" model will be used, in which mobile advance units penetrate deep into the territory, operating outside a dense logistical framework but with powerful artillery support at the tactical level.
This was already used in 2022–2023 in Ukraine, especially during the offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region, when assault companies were deployed and then logistical expansion was carried out along a narrow corridor without waiting for the flanks to be fully stabilised. In the event of an attack on Latvia, this would involve the capture or blockade of key transport hubs, including Jelgava, Tukums and possibly Ventspils, with minimal mop-up operations and only targeted control of communications.
The main goal would not be classic territorial control, but operational and political effects, the division of the country and the isolation of Riga. Russia could then issue an ultimatum: a ceasefire and recognition of the "new status quo" in exchange for the opening of a humanitarian corridor and the cessation of further mobilisation in the Baltic states.
In combination with a massive RE campaign — disruption of mobile communications, suppression of GPS and disinformation about the alleged mass flight of the government and the presence of "peace representatives" at the scene — Russia is likely seeking to create an atmosphere of partial collapse of the state power vertical in Latvia. This would repeat not only the Ukrainian scenario of February 2022, but also elements of the reactive pressure model that Russia used in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Crimea — not taking everything, but cutting off, intimidating and offering an "agreed way out" of the "dead end" that it itself created.
The ATO's remark is what the partners did not write about.
In reality, Russia is not preparing an attack on Latvia. It is preparing an attack from Latvia.
Nonsense? Not quite. Because in reality, this infrastructure is not for an attack on NATO, but for simulating a threat from the west, deep inside Russia itself. I will explain why
There are no suicidal Kremlin pensioners in Russia; they have no intention of fighting NATO. That is why they are preparing an inverted "22 June", only in the opposite direction.
The Russians do not want to attack, they want to be attacked.
The hidden mobilisation near the Latvian border is not for invasion, but to provoke an attack on itself, so that it can then declare "patriotic war number two" and blame the defeat in Ukraine on "the West starting a new war."
North Korean weapons and "malvas" are bait for NATO to take, so that Russia can then use force and resources on its own territory and "reach Berlin" (Riga).
If Russia goes down this path, the key objective would not necessarily be to capture the cities themselves, but to control transport hubs and intersections, which would be sufficient to paralyse the movement of reserves, cut off communications with Lithuania and the Suwalki Corridor, and force NATO into hasty and uncoordinated actions.
Moreover, given Russia's experience in the war against Ukraine, especially in the first months, electronic warfare (EW) and camouflage are likely to be widely used, including mobile groups operating without a single front line. In such conditions, there is a possibility of temporary loss of command and control in the Latvian sector of NATO, as well as a disconnect between political decisions and operational reality. This creates a window for projecting force — advancing to Tukums, partially blockading Riga, and possibly simulating preparations for an amphibious landing along the coast. From an informational and psychological point of view, this would be no less devastating than a full-scale occupation.
Based on the experience of the war against Ukraine, in particular the failure of large-scale Russian offensive operations in conditions of saturated ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance), it can be assumed that at this stage there will be no classic dense offensive formation. Instead, a "pulsing offensive" model will be used, in which mobile advance units penetrate deep into the territory, operating outside a dense logistical framework but with powerful artillery support at the tactical level.
This was already used in 2022–2023 in Ukraine, especially during the offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region, when assault companies were deployed and then logistical expansion was carried out along a narrow corridor without waiting for the flanks to be fully stabilised. In the event of an attack on Latvia, this would involve the capture or blockade of key transport hubs, including Jelgava, Tukums and possibly Ventspils, with minimal mop-up operations and only targeted control of communications.
The main goal would not be classic territorial control, but operational and political effects, the division of the country and the isolation of Riga. Russia could then issue an ultimatum: a ceasefire and recognition of the "new status quo" in exchange for the opening of a humanitarian corridor and the cessation of further mobilisation in the Baltic states.
In combination with a massive RE campaign — disruption of mobile communications, suppression of GPS and disinformation about the alleged mass flight of the government and the presence of "peace representatives" at the scene — Russia is likely seeking to create an atmosphere of partial collapse of the state power vertical in Latvia. This would repeat not only the Ukrainian scenario of February 2022, but also elements of the reactive pressure model that Russia used in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Crimea — not taking everything, but cutting off, intimidating and offering an "agreed way out" of the "dead end" that it itself created.
The ATO's remark is what the partners did not write about.
In reality, Russia is not preparing an attack on Latvia. It is preparing an attack from Latvia.
Nonsense? Not quite. Because in reality, this infrastructure is not for an attack on NATO, but for simulating a threat from the west, deep inside Russia itself. I will explain why
There are no suicidal Kremlin pensioners in Russia; they have no intention of fighting NATO. That is why they are preparing an inverted "22 June", only in the opposite direction.
The Russians do not want to attack, they want to be attacked.
The hidden mobilisation near the Latvian border is not for invasion, but to provoke an attack on itself, so that it can then declare "patriotic war number two" and blame the defeat in Ukraine on "the West starting a new war."
North Korean weapons and "malvas" are bait for NATO to take, so that Russia can then use force and resources on its own territory and "reach Berlin" (Riga).
Again, in contrast to Facebook, Google and Twitter, Telegram's founder Pavel Durov runs his company in relative secrecy from Dubai. This provided opportunity to their linked entities to offload their shares at higher prices and make significant profits at the cost of unsuspecting retail investors. Since January 2022, the SC has received a total of 47 complaints and enquiries on illegal investment schemes promoted through Telegram. These fraudulent schemes offer non-existent investment opportunities, promising very attractive and risk-free returns within a short span of time. They commonly offer unrealistic returns of as high as 1,000% within 24 hours or even within a few hours. Messages are not fully encrypted by default. That means the company could, in theory, access the content of the messages, or be forced to hand over the data at the request of a government. Right now the digital security needs of Russians and Ukrainians are very different, and they lead to very different caveats about how to mitigate the risks associated with using Telegram. For Ukrainians in Ukraine, whose physical safety is at risk because they are in a war zone, digital security is probably not their highest priority. They may value access to news and communication with their loved ones over making sure that all of their communications are encrypted in such a manner that they are indecipherable to Telegram, its employees, or governments with court orders.
from pl
