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Russian invasion of Latvia. Mission (im)possible

The Americans have written a lengthy article on the possible Russian invasion of Latvia. Interestingly, this is not the work of some amateur writers – the author of the publication is the Jamestown Foundation, an American think tank founded in 1984 to study threats from authoritarian regimes. This organisation specialises in analysing Russia, China, Iran, as well as terrorism and hybrid warfare. Its reports are read at the Pentagon, NATO and among intelligence officers.

The foundation is often the first to expose the Kremlin's military plans, which is why it is the target of Russian propaganda. For Moscow, it is "intelligence under the guise of analysis."

Here is the full article:

"Russia is exploiting Latvia's vulnerability to undermine the defence of the Baltic states

Russia is secretly deploying new motorised rifle divisions and modern artillery systems, including North Korean equipment, in regions near Latvia, forming a strategic reserve that is almost invisible to the public.

Belarus is becoming an operational flank bastion thanks to mobilisation, infrastructure modernisation near the border with Latvia and large-scale exercises simulating offensive manoeuvres, indicating close coordination with Russian strategic plans.

Infrastructure development in north-western Russia, including the modernisation of railways and depots, indicates preparations for a possible rapid invasion of Latvia.

The likely direction of the offensive will bypass strongholds in Latvia to reach logistics hubs, disconnect North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) defence forces and isolate Riga, potentially allowing Russia to gain a foothold in the Baltic region.

Drawing on its experience in Ukraine, Russia could employ "pulsed offensive tactics" using mobile units, electronic warfare and psychological operations to paralyse command structures and force a destabilising truce that recognises new territorial realities.

Over the past two years, there have been worrying structural changes in Russia's armed forces, especially in areas adjacent to Latvia. The deployment of entirely new motorised rifle divisions, including the 116th, 72nd, 74th and 86th motorised rifle divisions (guards), has begun in the Leningrad Military District and Belarus, which has not been reported in official communiqués. Their coordination, redeployment and re-equipment are taking place without the attention of the West, which may indicate that they are intended for another, alternative campaign.

At the same time, Russian convoys carrying the latest artillery systems and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), including self-propelled Malva howitzers and North Korean-made equipment, are being observed passing through Petrozavodsk, Pskov, Tikhvin and Gatchina in Russia, but are not reaching the front lines in Ukraine. This indicates the formation of a deep strategic reserve, either to suppress potential internal unrest or for a new theatre of operations.

The logistics of these echelons are carefully coordinated. Many platforms are covered with tarpaulins, and accompanying units restrict civilian access to platforms and stations. This indirectly confirms that this is not a rotation but a deliberate redeployment

Belarus, in this configuration, acts as an operational flank bastion. In 2024–2025, it intensified the formation of expanded divisional structures based on brigades and mobilised many reservists under the pretext of territorial defence. Soviet weapons depots that had not been used for decades were restored.

In the western part of the country (Glybokoe, Polatsk, Braslav), engineering work is intensifying, including the modernisation of motorways and bridges leading to the border with Latvia. This is an important sign – if we follow the methodology of Soviet military strategist Alexander Svechin and the Soviet General Staff – it is preparation for an offensive operation in its hidden stage.
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Russian invasion of Latvia. Mission (im)possible

The Americans have written a lengthy article on the possible Russian invasion of Latvia. Interestingly, this is not the work of some amateur writers – the author of the publication is the Jamestown Foundation, an American think tank founded in 1984 to study threats from authoritarian regimes. This organisation specialises in analysing Russia, China, Iran, as well as terrorism and hybrid warfare. Its reports are read at the Pentagon, NATO and among intelligence officers.

The foundation is often the first to expose the Kremlin's military plans, which is why it is the target of Russian propaganda. For Moscow, it is "intelligence under the guise of analysis."

Here is the full article:

"Russia is exploiting Latvia's vulnerability to undermine the defence of the Baltic states

Russia is secretly deploying new motorised rifle divisions and modern artillery systems, including North Korean equipment, in regions near Latvia, forming a strategic reserve that is almost invisible to the public.

Belarus is becoming an operational flank bastion thanks to mobilisation, infrastructure modernisation near the border with Latvia and large-scale exercises simulating offensive manoeuvres, indicating close coordination with Russian strategic plans.

Infrastructure development in north-western Russia, including the modernisation of railways and depots, indicates preparations for a possible rapid invasion of Latvia.

The likely direction of the offensive will bypass strongholds in Latvia to reach logistics hubs, disconnect North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) defence forces and isolate Riga, potentially allowing Russia to gain a foothold in the Baltic region.

Drawing on its experience in Ukraine, Russia could employ "pulsed offensive tactics" using mobile units, electronic warfare and psychological operations to paralyse command structures and force a destabilising truce that recognises new territorial realities.

Over the past two years, there have been worrying structural changes in Russia's armed forces, especially in areas adjacent to Latvia. The deployment of entirely new motorised rifle divisions, including the 116th, 72nd, 74th and 86th motorised rifle divisions (guards), has begun in the Leningrad Military District and Belarus, which has not been reported in official communiqués. Their coordination, redeployment and re-equipment are taking place without the attention of the West, which may indicate that they are intended for another, alternative campaign.

At the same time, Russian convoys carrying the latest artillery systems and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), including self-propelled Malva howitzers and North Korean-made equipment, are being observed passing through Petrozavodsk, Pskov, Tikhvin and Gatchina in Russia, but are not reaching the front lines in Ukraine. This indicates the formation of a deep strategic reserve, either to suppress potential internal unrest or for a new theatre of operations.

The logistics of these echelons are carefully coordinated. Many platforms are covered with tarpaulins, and accompanying units restrict civilian access to platforms and stations. This indirectly confirms that this is not a rotation but a deliberate redeployment

Belarus, in this configuration, acts as an operational flank bastion. In 2024–2025, it intensified the formation of expanded divisional structures based on brigades and mobilised many reservists under the pretext of territorial defence. Soviet weapons depots that had not been used for decades were restored.

In the western part of the country (Glybokoe, Polatsk, Braslav), engineering work is intensifying, including the modernisation of motorways and bridges leading to the border with Latvia. This is an important sign – if we follow the methodology of Soviet military strategist Alexander Svechin and the Soviet General Staff – it is preparation for an offensive operation in its hidden stage.
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BY Фашик Донецький





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